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INTRODUCTION
The study of learning and memory
through routines is acquiring a growing
interest in the present neuroscience. Many
works focusing on “habit learning” high-
light the relevance of such studies and
much weight is given to it in the under-
standing of individual’s behavior. The aim
of this paper is to connect the concept
of habit that arises from a neurobiolog-
ical viewpoint and from a philosophical
one. This will require a precise terminolog-
ical distinction and connection between
the two fields from an interdisciplinary
approach.
One of the most recent studies of the
use of the term “habit” in neuroscience
is the review of Carol Seger y Brian
Spiering, published in Frontiers in Systems
Neuroscience in 2011. In this work, the
authors make a historical evaluation of
expressions “habit” and “habit learning”
in these terms:  “Habit” roughly corre-
sponded to the resulting motor behavior
[. . .], and habit learning to acquisition of
these behaviors in an instrumental learn-
ing context. “Habit” presents therefore
these characteristics: inflexible, slow or
incremental, unconscious, automatic and
insensitive to reinforcer devaluation.
On the other hand, philosophical con-
cept of habit (hexis, habitus) is not only—
nor even mainly—related to a repetitive
behavior, but to the control or “pos-
session” of one’s action (se habere ad).
According to this, “habitus” is closer to the
concept of “quality” or “skill” than to that
of “stereotype” and appears as a vehicle of
free will.
Apparently both approaches, neuro-
biological and philosophical, seem dif-
ferent and unconnected. Nevertheless, a
possible bridge between them is the con-
sideration of habit as “stable disposition
for self-development.” In order to illus-
trate this statement, we will follow several
steps throughout the paper. First, we will
expose how the concept of life implies a
kind of self-activity and self-control, which
requires either stability and change at dif-
ferent levels. Second, we will deal with
the neurobiological understanding of sta-
ble behavior as seen in neurobiological
processes such as learning and memory,
“habit learning,” etc. And thirdly, we will
explain how the philosophical concept of
“habit” corresponds to dispositive quality
as control of one’s action. Finally, we will
try to integrate the two perspectives.
HABITS AS STABLE CONTROL OF
ACTIONS
From a philosophical point of view, life
consists in the activity of an individual
over itself (self-activity, self-control). A
living being is capable of actions whose
outcome doesn’t remain only outside,
but inside the living being itself. This
kind of activity implies a general scheme
of “feedback” and corresponds with the
Aristotelian concept of “praxis,” as differ-
ent to the concept of “poiesis.” “Praxis”
is an activity whose aim is the activity
itself, and so its outcome remains in the
individual (Metaphysics, IX, 6, 1048 b
18–35; Aristotle, 1924). Instead, “poiesis”
is an activity that produces something dif-
ferent from the action itself and so it
has an external outcome (Nicomachean
Ethics, VI, 4, 1140a 1–6; Aristotle, 2011).
Even though poiesis and praxis are dif-
ferent, they are not necessarily separa-
ble, but continuously interwoven in living
beings endowed with knowledge. Life as a
whole is praxis, but particular life activities
include both poiesis and praxis (Aristotle,
Politics, I, 2, 1254 a 7–8, Aristotle, 1990;
Vicente Arregui and Choza, 1991).
In the interaction of poiesis and praxis,
the living being not only maintains its
own structure, but it progressively devel-
ops it. In general, this development con-
sists in the extension or amplification of
one’s own physical structure. Nevertheless,
in the case of living beings endowed
with knowledge, development has also an
intensive dimension, as they can acquire
new capabilities through their interaction
with other beings. This intensive develop-
ment can be understood as “learning” or
“accumulated experience.” It results from
single actions, but it differs from them as
an acquired and stable capability. Aristotle
called that capability “habit” (hexis, habi-
tus) and understood it as making the sub-
ject of it able to perform new actions
(Nicomachean Ethics, II, 4, 1106 b 36;
Aristotle, 2011).
NEUROBIOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING
OF STABLE BEHAVIOR: LEARNING AND
MEMORY, “HABIT LEARNING,” etc.
On the part of empirical research, mod-
ern psychology has studied the concept
of “habit” quite in detail. The context of
it has been the study of learning and,
more in general, of animal behavior: see,
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for example, James (1890) and Watson
(1919). This perspective has gained in
depth thanks to the development of cogni-
tive experimental psychology and the stud-
ies on learning and memory during XX
century (Bernácer and Giménez-Amaya,
2013).
Since the second half of the 50’s, neu-
roscientific studies showed the progressive
implication of structures of the temporal
lobe in memory and in learning (Scoville
and Milner, 1957; Bernácer and Giménez-
Amaya, 2013). Those studies defined a
distinction between an explicit mem-
ory and an implicit one: in the former,
cortical structures are mostly involved,
mainly medial portions of temporal lobe;
in the latter, some subcortical structures
stand out, which belong to the basal
ganglia.
In sum, there has been a progressive
separation of two neurobiological pro-
cesses related to memory. On the one
hand, some mnesic processes reveal learn-
ing as related to processes of plastic-
ity, which imply a high cortical activity
(explicit memory). On the other hand,
other processes evince learning as the sta-
bilization of patterns of behavior—mainly
motor—, in which some subcortical struc-
tures intervene, as the aforementioned
basal ganglia (implicit memory).
The concept of “habit learning” was
introduced in cognitive neuroscience
through these premises. According to
Seger and Spiering (2011): “The concept of
habit learning has developed through the
fruitful interaction of researchers in sev-
eral intellectual domains, including animal
learning, cognitive psychology, cognitive
neuropsychology, and behavioral neuro-
science.” In large measure, the concept of
“habit learning” has been related to sub-
cortical structures of basal ganglia and,
therefore, to processes of learning involved
in implicit memory: see, for example,
reviews of Seger and Spiering (2011) and
Graybiel (2008).
Basal ganglia are structures strongly
connected among themselves, with a fun-
damental role in the organization of com-
plex circuits of cortical and subcortical
feedback (Mengual et al., 1999; Obeso
et al., 2002; Packard and Knowlton, 2002;
Lanciego et al., 2012). Two traits make
them especially relevant to study processes
of learning andmemory. First, their neural
circuits of feedback are much wider and
more complex than what was originally
thought. In fact, basal ganglia are not only
related to motor system in itself, but they
are also important as nodal points in broad
neural networks, which integrate motor
behavior with emotional and motivational
life, particularly frontostriatal circuits and
limbic areas: see, for instance, reviews of
Haber and Rauch (2010) and of Hwang
(2013). Second, they are privileged struc-
tures of central nervous system for the
understanding, at a molecular and synap-
tic level, of the strong interaction between
neurotransmitters and neuromodulators
involved in networks of implicit memory
(Kreitzer and Malenka, 2008). This per-
mits to establish complex patterns of cellu-
lar integration and of relations of nervous
cells among them.
These remarks show the significance
of basal ganglia in the study of “habit
learning.” This kind of learning has been
described as “inflexible, slow or incremen-
tal, unconscious, automatic, and insen-
sitive to reinforcer devaluation” (Seger
and Spiering, 2011). Nevertheless, there
is increasing evidence that, through their
cortical and subcortical circuits, some
degree of flexibility and control can be
established (Smith and Graybiel, 2014). In
fact, “habit learning” seems to be open
to include instances of plasticity, learn-
ing and memory (Graybiel, 2008; Howe
et al., 2011). As a result, several approaches
to “habit learning” are increasingly see-
ing it as a balance between behavioral
flexibility and fixity (Smith and Graybiel,
2014).
On one hand, some authors have
regarded the idea of “habit learning”
as the performance of an action, previ-
ously learned after many repetitions, in
an unconscious manner, and whose exe-
cution is inflexible and independent to
the outcome (Seger and Spiering, 2011;
Bernácer and Giménez-Amaya, 2013). On
the other hand, this perspective should
be integrated with other view that recog-
nizes sensitivity to the outcome and hence
different levels of flexibility and feed-
back, allowing integrating changes onto
behavioral processes or strategies. In this
way, the whole system allows several lev-
els of increase and development (Lombo
and Giménez Amaya, 2013; Smith and
Graybiel, 2014).
ADAPTATION AND CHANGE:
STABILITY vs. RIGIDITY
From the mentioned approach, some
opposition can be established between two
ways of understanding “habit learning.”
On the one hand, it appears as a rigid and
stereotyped behavior (Seger and Spiering,
2011). On the other hand, it can be under-
stood in a more open and flexible way,
what allows the incorporation of phe-
nomena of variability within a general
scheme of control (Graybiel, 2008; Smith
and Graybiel, 2014).
Deep in this opposition, we discover
that the second view does not exclude the
first one, but rather it presupposes it. In
fact, a habit is not a mere automatism or
a repetitive behavior, but a stable dispo-
sition for action (practical skill). The dif-
ference between habits and automatisms
or simple routines is that the former give
control over actions, while the latter don’t
(Nicomachean Ethics, II, 1, 1103 a 14-b 25;
Aristotle, 2011). As a consequence, the sta-
bility of habits differs from the rigidity of
automatisms.
Consequently, rigidity and the stereo-
typed character of “habit learning” should
be understood as “stability” of behavior,
rather than as an irremovable configu-
ration of it. This is therefore a richer
concept, from a semantic standpoint, and
points out to a stable basic structure
on which living being’s behavior is orga-
nized in a flexible manner. This flexibil-
ity allows adaptation to new stimuli and
development of new abilities. On the other
hand, excessive inflexibility makes adapta-
tion impossible andmay lead to behavioral
disorders, like obsessive-compulsive per-
sonality disorder, for instance (De Reus
and Emmelkamp, 2012).
This neurobiological view of “habit
learning” and recent experimental
contributions—especially those of pro-
fessor Graybiel—are consistent with the
philosophical concept of “habit” in human
being. This one is essentially based on
two aspects: (a) the stable character of an
acquired quality; and (b) the capacity for
new actions that arises from that quality
(Millán-Puelles, 2002).
In first place, habit is related to “hav-
ing,” as the term indicates in its Latin orig-
inal form (“habitus” comes from “habere,”
to have). According to Aristotle, a sub-
ject may have other realities or may
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have itself as related to other realities
(Nicomachean Ethics, II, 4, 1105 b 25–26;
Aristotle, 2011). This “having himself” as
related to something means actually “to
be disposed in relation to something”:
Aristotle’s Metaphysics, V, 20; 1022 b
10–12 (Aristotle, 1924). For this author,
habit (“hexis”) is not a simple reaction to
the influence or activity of other subjects
(he calls this influences “pathe,” passions).
It is rather to “dispose himself” from
that influence, acquiring a stable capac-
ity to accomplish something in a way that
becomes usual. A habit can be described
therefore as a usual way of behaving, so
that Aristotle refers to it also as a “sec-
ond nature”: Aristotle’s Categories, VIII 9
a 4 (Aristotle, 1930). Inasmuch as “habit”
is not a simple reaction, but a stable dis-
position to action, it has been compared
with cybernetic processes (Polo, 2002).
This disposition, in fact, is stable and
progressive, but not properly rigid.
CONCLUSIVE REMARKS
As we have seen, neurobiological con-
cept of “habit” is reflected in the so
called “habit learning.” This implies two
main aspects, that’s to say, stability of
behavior (that can be interpreted as “rigid-
ity” or “stereotype”) and its flexibiliza-
tion in front of new stimuli (Seger and
Spiering, 2011; Smith and Graybiel, 2014).
This is clearly verified in superior mam-
mals, but in the case of human being we
find a special richness in his behavioral
response. Neurobiological ground of that
higher development can be found in the
remarkable growth of his cortical and sub-
cortical networks (basal ganglia, among
other structures), and in his extraordinary
cellular and high synaptic variety (see for
example, Nijhuis et al., 2013).
We can discover, in sum, a connec-
tion between neurobiological and philo-
sophical standpoints. On one hand, “habit
learning” implies a stabilization of neuro-
biological information that subsequently
allows its storage and re-utilization in
front of new stimuli. On the other, philo-
sophical description of “habit” presents
it as feedback of human activity. This
feedback allows not only to keep our
activities, but also to use them again in
front of new phenomena, making possible
continuity and articulation of experience.
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